

Conclusion

In addition to updating the report of the first *Independent Expert Group on Antisemitism* from November 2011 as the initial survey on antisemitism in Germany, the second *Independent Expert Group* dealt with a variety of themes that had little or no relevance in the time frame of the first report, or themes that the *Bundestag* as the commissioning body wished to place in the foreground. New in this report are the perspectives of those affected by antisemitism as well as the initial findings on possible antisemitism among refugees. Also considered in detail are developments in the Internet and in social media, which have become central instruments for the spread of hate and antisemitic agitation. The second expert group gave special attention to the theme of prevention; in addition to projects oriented towards youth, they focused on the long-neglected topic of adult education. In contrast to the first report, the focus here is more on the theoretical discussion about sustainable pedagogical approaches of education for prevention. An important field that the first Expert Group touched on was once again dealt with in the new report. A study was commissioned to provide insights into an area that has been at the center of media attention for years, through qualitative interviews with imams on antisemitism among Muslim congregants. Rather often the impression is given that »the Muslims« are the main bearers of antisemitism in this country. With the arrival of refugees, these ascriptions have become more acute. One result is that right-wing extremism as the central milieu of antisemitic content in the societal confrontation with antisemitism in Germany has slipped into the background. In particular, Muslim associations and mosque congregations are looked at unreflectively as breeding grounds for antisemitic agitation and imams characterized as »preachers of hate.« As of yet there have been very few investigations into antisemitic attitudes in Muslim religious milieus that could support such assumptions; the study on imams is a first approach to the topic.

According to the *Independent Expert Group* it is important to study antisemitism among Muslims and undertake to strengthen prevention efforts, but also to keep an eye on anti-Muslim discrimination. At the same time, the UEA warns explicitly against neglecting or even implicitly trivializing antisemitism among right-wing extremists and in the societal and political mainstream, while focusing on antisemitism among Muslims.

Definition

The Expert Group has dealt extensively with the question of how to appropriately define the phenomenon of antisemitism and has developed a scientific definition that attempts to grasp the various facets of anti-Jewish sentiment as it appears in political and societal settings as well as in current virulent discourse. For the practical work of the police or judiciary, we find the definition that was developed in 2005 by various NGOs and the former *European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia* (EUMC) – today called the *Fundamental Rights Agency* (FRA) – to be appropriate in categorizing the complex forms of antisemitic expression. The importance that this definition has now gained in the international context – despite some critical voices in academia – can be seen in the fact that it was adopted in 2016 by the 31 member states in the *International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance* (IHRA) and introduced by the British parliament as a working definition. There is no generally accepted, valid definition of antisemitism; one can only approach the phenomenon, which is extremely flexible and adaptable over time. For its more subtle expressions that don't fall into the category of possible criminal content, the decisive aspect is the context – and what was said to whom at which time and with which intention.

Antisemitism is articulated in many different forms, from latent attitudes and verbalized defamation, to political demands and discriminatory practices, to personal attacks. A more exact analysis of criminal incidents and violent attacks as well as survey data on antisemitic attitudes are indispensable for the evaluation of the degree and spread of antisemitism. This does not include more subtle forms, such as subliminal defamations that do not constitute a criminal offense; these can only be evaluated through interviews with those affected, or through their readiness to report such incidents.

Crimes

In Germany, antisemitic crimes fall under the category of politically motivated crimes (PMK). Today, the overwhelming majority of xenophobic crimes are classified as extremist, and antisemitic crimes are generally regarded as such. Both are summarized under the term »hate crimes.« A singular feature of hate

crime, which is also referred to as prejudice-motivated crime, is the random selection of victims to be intimidated and frightened through verbal and physical violence.

Criteria for the recording of politically motivated crimes and thus also for the subset of cases with antisemitic motivation have long been subject to criticism and have prompted police authorities and the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) to discuss possibilities for improvement. The introduction in 2001 of a new definition system – »Politisch motivierte Kriminalität« (PMK, or politically motivated crimes) – already represents an improvement over the previous practice. The central criteria for recording incidents is now the »politically motivated act«; that is, the recording of incidents is not based on the concept of extremism, but on the motivation behind the act. The new system of »Guidelines for the Criminal Police Alert Service in Cases of Politically Motivated Crime« (KPMD-PMK) now also covers crimes motivated by hate or prejudice in addition to the classic crimes against the state and extremist offenses. The police can, however, only record those offenses that they have identified themselves or about which they have been informed by a third party. In other words, as with all forms of criminality, we are dealing here with a brightfield darkfield problem – officially recorded crimes versus those that are not registered. This can be attributed in part to so-called underreporting: Many victims or witnesses of antisemitic crimes do not report the incidents. The actual number of antisemitic incidents (from BKA, crimes registered in 2014: 1,596 and in 2015: 1,366; violent crimes in 2014: 45 and in 2015: 36) is also systematically underestimated since only the offense with the highest penalty is counted in every incident involving several offenses (for example libel, robbery, bodily injury). The classification of a crime as antisemitic depends on the perception and the criteria by which an act is categorized. The police still apparently tend to use avoidance strategies. Even when the motivation for a crime seems obvious, they frequently point to alternative, non-political explanations. For example, there is a wide discrepancy between the number of right-wing extremist motivated murders reported by the authorities and those reported by journalists and NGOs. Despite standards stating the contrary, courts seldom consider hate crimes to be an aggravating circumstance and in the course of criminal prosecutions of acts of violence judged to be motivated by right-wing extremism, there is a gradual decrease in the determination of »prejudice« as a motivation. The BKA statistic is an input statistic; in other words, all reported cases are counted, along with their determined or assumed motivations. Until recently, however, there was no overview regarding the numbers of investigations and convictions. This gap was finally closed in 2016 with the publication of long-kept statistics from the BFJ, Federal Office of Justice, about proceedings in cases of right-wing extremist / xenophobic crimes (including antisemitic crimes), which listed the number and ages of suspects, arrest warrants, convictions or other decisions bringing the cases to a close. But with antisemitic crimes there is only a list of the preliminary investigations by state, which makes it impossible to draw conclusions about further specifications for these crimes.

Approaches

In historical comparison with the period before 1945, as well as with the last 60 years in Germany or with most other European countries, open antisemitism has rarely been as marginalized as it is today. At the same time, modern facets of antisemitism remain as widespread as ever in the general population. This includes the demand for a »Schlussstrich« – an end to discussions about the Holocaust – in which a certain typical antisemitic victim-perpetrator reversal resonates. And on the other hand it includes Israel-related antisemitism. In addition, we are currently experiencing a mobilization of antisemitism in certain well-known spectra – namely in the arenas of right-wing and left-wing extremism, but also in Islamistic fundamentalism – that has been fueled by several parallel developments in the political world situation since 1989. A relatively stable situation concerning the spread of antisemitic attitudes in the population is accompanied by increased activity on the level of expression and propaganda, as well as violent attacks.

All statements used for the documentation of antisemitism in current representative studies are so closely linked that they form a single dimension that clearly can be interpreted as antisemitism – and this applies to classical antisemitism as well as secondary and Israel-related antisemitism. In some cases, this public approval can be seen in a harsh criticism of Israel without necessarily having any antisemitic connotation. However, empirical evidence confirms a close link to antisemitism when it comes to comparisons of Israeli policies to Nazi policies. The phenomenon of social desirability generally leads to a lower degree of acceptance of classical antisemitism and a greater acceptance of the more subtle forms, which can also be described as communication latencies. Modern manifestations of antisemitism, such as secondary antisemitism communicated via Holocaust references and the Israel-related antisemitism that comes in the

guise of antisemitically loaded criticism of Israel, are less likely to threaten social standing and are thus communicated more openly.

The degree of public approval measured in various studies is comparable only to a limited extent due to varying survey methods (including a different scaling of answer categories). In addition, any comparison of the extent of approval of different facets of antisemitism must be carried out with caution, since the statements in studies are formulated in different ways – sometimes harsh, sometimes soft – making it too hard or too easy to determine approval of individual statements. But studies do reveal hints about antisemitism's prevalence and ways in which it is expressed. Representative surveys of the German population indicate an ongoing decline in open, classic antisemitic attitudes over the past 15 years, a trend that continued in 2016. Thus the rate of approval of classical antisemitic views, which (in keeping with conspiracy theory patterns) assumes Jews have »too much influence« and accepts classic antisemitic stereotypes, was only about five percent in 2016, while in 2002 it was still around nine percent. Approval of secondary antisemitism also has dropped significantly, though 26 percent of the population still approves. But forms of Israel-based antisemitism were found in 40 percent of the population in 2016. Harsh criticism of Israel is not necessarily associated with antisemitism, but often is. In 2004, 80 to 90 percent of the population that agreed with non-antisemitic criticism of Israel also expressed approval of at least one aspect of antisemitism. In the follow-up to the so-called »Mitte-Studie« of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in 2014, 55 percent of those who were critical of Israel also approved of at least one additional aspect of anti-Jewish hostility that included Israel-related antisemitism. Of those surveyed, 53 percent approved of at least one further dimension of antisemitism without any direct relation to Israel.

Antisemitism in the sense of prejudice against Jews correlates with disregard for other social groups: For example, one who holds xenophobic attitudes is highly likely to also hold antisemitic attitudes. Antisemitism is clearly linked to right-wing populism, right-wing extremism and new-right positions.

While the degree of antisemitic attitudes among the older generations has declined, among younger generations there has been no change. One can see a positive generational effect here that does not seem easy to continue. Generally, demographic factors play a minor role in the explanation of antisemitism. If anything, better education does correlate with a lower degree of traditional and secondary antisemitism, but has little effect on Israel-related antisemitism.

Nowadays, antisemitism is most prevalent in the lower social strata, while approval for antisemitism in the middle classes – defined by income, education and profession – is in the middle range. No increase has been found here. But antisemitism is also found among those respondents who consider themselves to be in the political center or who prefer center political parties. Those who consider themselves to be »far left« or prefer left parties do not show any greater tendencies toward antisemitism than do voters for other democratic parties. This applies to Israel-related antisemitism as well. But respondents who prefer the AfD party also exhibit a remarkably high approval rate for all facets of antisemitism.

Membership in one of the major Christian denominations and the degree of identification with religiosity plays practically no role at all regarding approval of antisemitic views. Christians thus are not antisemitic per se, but they are also no less antisemitic than atheists. On the other hand, antisemitism is increasingly taking hold among Christian fundamentalists. The extent of antisemitic attitudes among youths and adults from a Muslim social milieu including those with immigrant background is higher than among non-Muslims. At the same time there are clear differences between Muslims from different cultures or regions. In particular, migrants from Arabic or North African countries tend to be antisemitic. Thus, aside from religion, it appears that the region of origin is key. It is necessary to differentiate. While young Muslims are much more likely to be antisemitic than their non-Muslim peers, there is hardly any difference between Muslims and non-Muslims over the age of 60; and younger Muslims are antisemitic to a similar degree as older non-Muslims. Education also contributes to the reduction of antisemitism among young Muslims. While their own experience of exclusion can become a motivation and legitimization for the devaluation of others, as well as for antisemitism, it is not an excuse.

The perspectives of those affected by antisemitism

A commissioned study on those affected by antisemitism revealed that the great majority of respondents see antisemitism, including the distorted representation of Israel, as a serious problem. They encounter antisemitism particularly in the Internet and other media, but also at demonstrations and through verbal and everyday insults. Many have the impression that antisemitism has increased in recent years and they fear

that the future could hold further escalations. According to the observations of respondents, openly antisemitic groups are increasingly encountered on social media platforms like *Facebook*. In addition, given the refugees from countries from the Middle East, there is a major fear that they could be bringing with them the antisemitism that is widespread in their home countries. The respondents are confronted with many forms of antisemitism, ranging from subtle forms to openly expressed antisemitic stereotypes. They are particularly concerned about being confronted with antisemitism in situations of power dependency. For many respondents, antisemitism is an everyday and frequent experience. Most frequently, they identify Muslims as perpetrators, followed by left and right-wing oriented people and – particularly when it comes to antisemitic innuendos – also people from the »general population«. Almost all respondents find the antisemitism with which they are confronted to be stressful. At the same time, very few decide to report concrete incidents and even fewer seek counseling. Thus the darkfield of non-reported incidents, including serious ones, is most likely high.

Media discourse

Antisemitic content disseminated via the Internet reflects existing attitudes in society. The Internet is merely a medium for transmission. Antisemitic views are, however, amplified in the Net through the possibility of rapid spread and wide coverage. In addition, the Net makes it easier for likeminded groups to connect, which then results in increasingly radicalized postings. Anyone who tries to learn about the Middle East conflict, for example, via social media slips quickly into the propaganda mills that refer to Israel as a »terror state,« an »apartheid regime« or a state whose citizens are »child killers.« This often combines with Holocaust-related or secondary antisemitism and a reversal of the perpetrator-victim role. The same applies to conspiracy theories whose antisemitic content is recognizable, if sometimes only at second glance. Just as antisemitism remains widespread worldwide, it is also found in the social media. Anyone who wants to act out their antisemitism can do so in social networks without hesitation and to a great extent also unregulated. The Net knows no national boundaries and the possibilities for societal sanctions are limited. In the last two years, the debate has intensified. It appears there is no longer a taboo against spreading antisemitic stereotypes and prejudices – at least when it comes to the social networks. Content that only a few years ago would be expressed in letters to the *Central Council of Jews in Germany* or to the Israeli Embassy in Berlin – and thus read by only a few – is now posted and shared outright on the Internet.

As a digital theme of social interaction, antisemitic content in social networks gets a lot of attention. But every network deals differently with antisemitic content on their platforms. This is due in part to each given society's understanding of freedom of expression; but on the other hand, the assessment of critical content is always the responsibility of employees of a given platform. They decide whether content should be removed. Operators of social networks, for example, are reluctant to erase content that denies Israel's right to exist. In fact, the denial of the state's right to exist is not a punishable offense.

Holocaust-denying content also has been treated in different ways. On platforms originating in Germany, such content would have to be deleted for legal reasons. On the whole, however, the amount of content that has been rendered inaccessible is limited. On *Facebook* such content is usually blocked for Germany and not removed. Users themselves often lack the relevant background knowledge in order to, for example, recognize and oppose Israel-related antisemitism. The same applies to conspiracy theories. Social media favors emotional communication and speeds it up so that many debates on such sensitive topics as antisemitism are carried out on a purely emotional level. This poses major problems for those engaged in fighting antisemitism, since critical debates are almost impossible against this background.

A certain sensitization can be recognized among the operators of *Facebook* or *YouTube*, as well as among the online editorial departments of newspapers. These media have begun to act more responsibly. This is apparent not least because they repeatedly turn down the opportunity to comment on films or other contributions that have been removed. Either content that incites hate was briefly on the Internet until the comments list was deactivated, or entries with comments were blocked from the outset because the operators were concerned about possibly illegal content.

Parties

All political parties represented in the Bundestag have developed a much higher sensitivity toward the theme of antisemitism than they had in the 1990s and early 2000s, although to some extent they still fall

into the old notions that antisemitism by definition is based on racist ideas. This can be seen particularly within the realm of educational programming, which still focuses on National Socialism and the Holocaust in the belief that this is relevant for the fight against antisemitism.

The extent to which a certain sensitization toward the subject is due to deeper insight or to a consideration for popular sentiments cannot be determined. But there also were no further events such as the »Hohmann affair« or »Möllemann affaire«. In the former case, the CDU reacted at first with hesitation but then firmly, expelling Hohmann from the party (in 2016 he joined the AfD). This was carried out against internal resistance within the party; this wing has in recent years increasingly lost influence. For its part, the FDP at the time did not react so clearly and quickly to the »Möllemann« phenomenon. Nevertheless, the end of the affair was a lesson that for purely strategic reasons would strengthen sensitivity toward the issue.

The SPD sees itself as representing a long tradition of fighting antisemitism. This also corresponds to the historical situation up to the present, but this does not mean there are no antisemitic attitudes among party members, as is also the case with the CDU / CSU or the FDP. With the *Greens*, their anti-Israel faction has lost relevance in the course of the party's development. Views on the Middle East conflict with antisemitic connotations are not expressed publicly and the party confronts Israel-related antisemitism in left-wing circles. The Left Party takes a different approach: On one hand, individual legislators such as Petra Pau are extremely engaged in fighting all forms of antisemitism both on a parliamentary level and in public discourse; on the other hand, there are still members in one wing of the party who hold pronounced anti-Israel positions. Even though the party leadership distances itself from such views, there are no clear consequences for such stands among party members.

In all, the parties have a very cautious approach to scandals: Antisemitic events within their own ranks have mostly been discussed in media but not by party members. Accordingly, there are optimization potentials for enhancing internal sensitization; training activities could serve this purpose, for example. With regard to measures aimed at combating antisemitism, all parties argue for greater commitment. Their focus concentrates on political education in which remembrance of the persecution and murder of the Jews in the Second World War takes center stage.

None of the parties has a clearly defined approach regarding how best to counter current antisemitism. The answers to the questions that the UEA posed to all political parties represented in the Bundestag and at least two state legislatures contain a list of general statements that, however, are not linked to specific models. This also applies to the question about the where to draw the line under criticism of Israel, beyond which human rights concerns swing towards anti-Jewish resentment. The theme is on the table with the FDP, the *Greens* and *The Left Party*. However, beyond the ongoing discussion process, there are no further explanations.

Justified criticism notwithstanding, the basic rejection of antisemitism among all these parties is established. When it comes to the AfD, an unambiguous assessment cannot be carried out even if the party leadership distances itself from questions about anti-Jewish sentiment. The AfD was the only party that did not respond to the catalog of questions submitted by the UEA. But since there has been a rather regular procession of related scandals, the AfD leadership could have taken a position in the face of so many cases arising since its relatively recent founding.

Movements

In the first UEA report the only political/social movement that came under scrutiny was the globalization network *Attac* and its proximity to antisemitic attitudes. *Attac* has since lost much of its importance in public discourse, but other groups that fall under the category of social movements have developed, primarily with right-wing populist orientations. As an example, the »Montagsmahnwachen« report examined both Pegida and the phenomenon of »Reichsbürger« (imperial citizens) with regard to their possible antisemitic connotations. But antisemitism in right-wing extremist movements as well as in Salafist groups that operate in Germany was also an issue.

Overall, open antisemitism does not play a dominant role in *Pegida*, but antisemitism forms the accompanying text in a series of statements, or resonates as a subtext in many cases. In particular the spread of conspiracy theories and the aggressive attitude towards refugees, immigrants and Muslims as well as toward efforts to recognize the equal rights of non-heterosexuals and women, which became clear among speakers and demonstrators, are a serious gateway for antisemitism. In quite a few speeches held during *Pegida* demonstrations, antisemitic code words have been detected. In addition, different

expressions of open antisemitism could be observed either as single events or cumulatively, at »-gida« demonstrations, regionally and locally, especially at smaller events, which usually have a higher proportion of right-wing extremists, including organized ones. There are developments in the movement in the orientation and composition of participants, which indicate increasing radicalization. Over the course of time, the resentments expressed by invited speakers as well as by demonstration participants have become more open and aggressive. The influence of Pegida and its offshoots on the political culture and mood in the Federal Republic cannot yet be conclusively assessed and is also difficult to prove. The relatively close connections or even shared actors with other right-populist and right-extremist movements play an important role in the hardening of positions represented by *Pegida*. This includes primarily the networking and/or mixing with the so-called *Querfront*, with leaders in the so-called Monday demonstrations and relevant media such as *Compact* and the internet platform *PI-news*, which also reveal connections with neo-right movements like the *Identitären Bewegung* and political parties like the NPD and AfD. Among the participants one increasingly finds members of different right-wing scenes – hooligans, the *Identitären*, offshoots of the AfD – which points to a need for special attention with regard to antisemitism in their ranks.

The Monday demonstrations represent a politically heterogeneous protest movement. Most participants understand themselves as rather left-wing politically. But because of their openness and lack of a political and substantive definition, they offer a scope for topics – with personifying criticism of finance capitalism; with the claim that the Federal Republic is not a sovereign state; with criticism of supposedly manipulated media (»Lügenpresse,« or lying media); world conspiracy theories, etc. – that exhibit a dangerous proximity to the central topoi of antisemitism and to right-wing constructions.

The third form of social movement that the UEA has examined closely is the Salafist scene. Despite the antisemitic notions that are part of Salafist ideology and the attacks by Salafists in Europe, which are often directed against Jews and Jewish institutions, the Islamism experts Olaf Farschid and Rudolph Ekkehard assume that in »mainstream Salafism« there is no difference in the attitude towards Judaism and Christianity and that therefore there is no »specific anti-Jewish and politically anti-Zionist perception of the Jewish faith.« Both Judaism and Christianity are regarded as adulterations of the one divine truth. Anti-Jewish attitudes tend to be subordinate. However, Farschid and Ekkehard emphasize the use of antisemitic stereotypes in Salafist movements in the Middle East, which follow a traditional line of historical enmity between Jews and Muslims, ranging from early Islam to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Religion

Although it was a central concern of the second *Independent Expert Group on Antisemitism* to follow the recommendations of the first group of experts and to present an analysis of possible antisemitic attitudes or incidents on the communal level in the Protestant and Catholic churches, it was not possible to provide the necessary results. In order to illuminate the theme at least to some extent, experts on the church congresses, on Good Friday liturgy and on the »Slenczka debate« were collected and evaluated. A qualitative study commissioned in 2014 by the Synod of the Protestant Church in Germany (EKD) and carried out by ProVal (Society for Sociological Analysis - Consultancy - Evaluation) on the question of how different communal contexts and the manifestations of antisemitism, fear of Islam and homophobia are related and what relationships there may be between individual beliefs, religious practices and the manifestations of antisemitism, anti-Islam and homophobia was unfortunately published only after the editorial deadline of this report.

Therefore an investigation of the discourse on the communal level, of the content of confirmation classes and other educational programs within the church setting must remain a goal. Mainstream churches distance themselves from all manifestations of antisemitism but that does not mean that all antisemitic connotations are excluded on the communal level or in the preparation of church-based trips to Israel.

The study commissioned by the UEA on »Attitudes of Muslims and Muslim Organizations to Jews« can be seen as a first exploratory study in a field for which there is as yet virtually no empirical data. In interviews with imams, there were no radical antisemitic stereotypes shown, but comparisons were drawn between the National Socialist persecution and murder of German and European Jews and the situation for Palestinians today. Most of those asked showed thoroughly reflective attitudes towards Jews as well as to Judaism and referred to their daily endeavors to reduce prejudice in their congregations. However, the tension created by conflicting expectations of the non-Muslim majority society versus the notions of the Muslim communities in which these imams move also became clear. Here, a largely reflected attitude could be found among the

imams. This attitude was also evident in other areas such as the interpretation of the Koran, dealing with the Middle East conflict and the confrontation with the Holocaust.

Particularly important to the imams who were interviewed was their perception of a lesser social attention for anti-Muslim racism, which also reflects the opinion of many Muslim community members. For the fight against both antisemitism and anti-Muslim hate, it thus seems necessary for Muslim and Jewish communities to see themselves as partners and to develop joint strategies rather than build up a competition over victimhood. Additional studies on this topic will be needed in order to confirm the investigation results.

Escape

The findings of an initial study, commissioned by the UEA, that approached the subject of antisemitism in connection with escape and refugees suggest a comparatively high degree of antisemitic attitudes and major gaps in knowledge among refugees from Arabic and North African countries or countries of the Middle East. At the same time there is a great interest in learning about the Holocaust. In particular, the Middle East conflict and the thoroughly antisemitic interpretation of it plays a major role, but classic antisemitic stereotypes and conspiracy theories are also encountered. In many countries of origin, knowledge about Israel, with a clear assignation of perpetrator-victim roles, is ubiquitous. The Middle East conflict is not explained in religious terms but rather in terms of unequal distribution of resources. But since the Syrian war involves identifiable and other enemies, the Middle East conflict has shifted to the background. Also thanks to the Arab Spring, the image of Israel appears to have changed in the eyes of some interviewees.

The findings suggest major differences between refugees from different countries, each with different antisemitic characteristics and socialization. They also underscore the role of collective religious, national and ethnic identities. It is likely that refugees have a conflicted connection to their country of origin, where (on one hand) they were socialized and from which (on the other hand) they have fled. Their strong support for the basic values of human rights, democracy, freedom of religious practice and care and respect when dealing with others is striking and is positively emphasized in contrast to the conditions in their country of origin.

The conditions that many refugees are forced to endure may also have a negative influence regarding the development of antisemitism. While the refugees still are primarily concerned with the everyday problems of building a new life and antisemitism is not a major topic, there is concern that disappointments and personal experiences of discrimination and marginalization in Germany could trigger radicalization.

This could happen in particular if refugees make connections with or are targeted by radicalized migrant milieus. The antisemitism that in many refugees is latent could then translate into antisemitic actions.

There are overall many indications of widespread antisemitism among refugees from Arab and Muslim countries. At the same time, the situation is also complex. There is a danger of focusing narrowly on only the Muslim populations or, currently, on refugees as bearers of antisemitic attitudes.

Prevention

The UEA commissioned *Socius Organisationsberatung* with evaluating six selected educational projects in the field of antisemitism prevention. The goal of the evaluation was to »Identify concrete ›best practice‹ approaches and methods in the prevention of antisemitism in the framework of historical and political education work«. Between spring and fall of 2016, six projects were evaluated in the fields of school, sport, religious-based institutions, youth, specialists in various fields and »other,« all of which were initiated or supported in large part through grants from specific federal or state programs.

Two relevant findings emerged already during the project research stage: Outside of special public funding programs, hardly any projects could be researched that were dealing with current antisemitism and not concentrating on historical antisemitism. Those running the programs and those supporting them were reluctant to allow an evaluation (with the exception of sport).

The project participants that *Socius* interviewed agreed that current antisemitism is of greater relevance, but plays hardly any role in the social space of the target groups and thus is very rarely asked about. The educational projects that *Socius* evaluated develop various strategies to reach their target groups. They reach out personally to various target groups – from teens to working adults – or they are introduced to

these groups via schools and other institutions. They also mention social networks like *Facebook* and – in individual cases – decision-makers in institutions. Many of those interviewed report that it is difficult or took longer than expected to win schools or institutions as reliable cooperation partners.

The projects attach great importance to the capacity for self-reflection as a prerequisite for the success of educational work. The evaluated projects have access to largely conclusive theoretical concepts, some with more, others with fewer experimental elements. Most of the projects deal with current antisemitism in the context of other phenomena of group-focused enmity (GFE), but also emphasize the specificity of antisemitism as an independent and special phenomenon. They also deal with its various manifestations, such as secondary or Israel-related antisemitism.

Another challenge faced by project sponsors in designing and implementing basic and advanced training measures is the differing concepts of current-day antisemitism. There is no uniform definition of antisemitism that is relevant to all situations and projects.

According to the evaluation report, the educational approaches are just as diverse as the theoretical references. They originate from historical-political education, democracy education, anti-discrimination education, antiracist and intercultural pedagogy and creative pedagogy. The formats include training programs, collegial advice and supervision. The consideration of emotions – including desires, resistance strategies and defensive reactions – is important. Of central significance is the sustained promotion of solid, long-term cooperation between regulatory bodies, such as between schools or providers of child and youth welfare assistance and specialized educational institutions; and the improvement of cooperation between the federal government and Länder in the context of holistic prevention and intervention. In addition, there must be a stronger interlinking of post-colonial, anti-racist and anti-antisemitism approaches with the aim of developing an educational approach that is interdisciplinary, sensitive towards differences and goes beyond the constructed »groups« of the GFE (keyword intersectionality).

Examples

In the chapter on the definition of antisemitism, especially when it comes to the discussion about Israel's policies, it was pointed out that it is often difficult to distinguish between critical and antisemitic statements. The Expert Group tried to grasp this difficulty through the use of the construct »grey zone.«

This is intended to take account of the fact that, while that the boundaries between criticism of Israeli politics on the one hand – even tough or unjustified criticism – and antisemitism on the other are theoretically definable, when it comes to actual cases it can be much more difficult to decide whether a certain statement about Israel is to be understood as critical or antisemitic. In such cases, it comes down to the context of a statement, such as who said what, when it was said and whether the criticism was accompanied by assumptions about a Jewish collective, loaded with stereotypical features or used Israel in place of »the Jews« in the sense of a »detour communication,« almost as a legitimization of antisemitic attitudes and positions. It should also be borne in mind that regardless of whether a statement is »motivated« by antisemitism, its content can be assessed as antisemitic.

The debate about the statements of journalist and publisher Jakob Augstein in late 2012 showed how controversial the assessment of his criticism of Israel's policy was among the public, and this is also true of journalists from respected media, representatives of Jewish organizations and academics who took a stand. This in turn makes it clear that – as evidenced by the challenge of finding a generally accepted and comprehensive definition of antisemitism – ideas about when criticism of Israel can be defined as antisemitism can differ widely even among those who might well agree in their evaluation of the antisemitic character of statements in the debates on circumcision and on antisemitism in soccer (see below). The term »grey zones« is intended to make these interpretative ambiguities transparent and to allow a debate about what can be regarded as antisemitism in individual cases.

The hate-filled excesses of the circumcision debate, which were particularly virulent in the Internet, have shown once again that a single trigger event can incite latent antisemitic feelings and bring them unfiltered to the surface via social networks. The impression became increasingly clear that circumcision and the shifting of lines of argument from religious customs to questions of children's rights and human rights offered a welcome change from the by now classical accusations in the Middle East conflict, which presumably would not carry antisemitic connotations. The course of the debate made it abundantly clear that the dominant society lacks sensitivity regarding the impact that such public, inflammatory accusations would have on those affected.

Open expressions of antisemitism have been rare in the Bundesliga in recent years, but the lower leagues seem to have more problems. There has not yet been any research on any overall change in the number and severity of antisemitic incidents, especially since here, too, the darkfield of unreported incidents could be substantial. Antisemitism remains part of the discrimination picture in soccer, primarily coming from right-wing fan groups and hooligans and more often than not linked with anti-Israel aspects.

Using the vehicle of sport, antisemitism gains a considerable social impact. Those most directly and severely affected are the Jewish Maccabi clubs and Israeli sports teams – which recently have become the target of antisemitic hostility, especially from Turkish-Muslim clubs and their players – and anti-racism fan groups that have been attacked by right-wing factions from within their own clubs. There is no common overarching strategy on the association level to combat antisemitism in stadia; reactions to such incidents are inconsistent and sports courts hand down overly mild judgments. Fan projects, too, often address racist and physical violence only generally and fail to take the threatening climate of verbal attacks seriously enough.